Janet Parker, a medical photographer in Birmingham, UK, became the last person in the world to die from smallpox in 1978. Her death was shocking, occurring decades after the disease had been eliminated from the UK and just as global eradication was imminent. The World Health Organization was close to declaring the virus defeated when this isolated case appeared. Parker’s infection signaled a profound failure in laboratory containment, initiating a public health emergency in a city that believed itself safe.
The Unprecedented Infection
Janet Parker first felt unwell on August 11, 1978, reporting symptoms like a severe headache and muscle aches, initially mistaken for the flu. A rash soon appeared on her chest, limbs, and face, leading a general practitioner to suspect chickenpox. This misdiagnosis was expected, as smallpox had not been seen in the UK for years. Although Parker had been vaccinated in 1966, the protection had waned over time.
By August 20, her condition deteriorated severely, and she was admitted to East Birmingham Hospital. Doctors grew concerned as the rash progressed into pustular lesions covering her entire body, including her palms and soles. On August 24, a consultant officially diagnosed Variola major, the most lethal form of the smallpox virus. The presence of smallpox, considered extinct in the wild, instantly triggered a massive public health response. Parker was transferred to secure isolation facilities at Catherine-de-Barnes Hospital, where she died on September 11, 1978, following complications including pneumonia and renal failure.
Tracing the Source of the Outbreak
An immediate investigation was launched to determine how Parker, who had not traveled abroad, contracted the virus. Investigators focused on her workplace at the University of Birmingham Medical School. Parker’s darkroom and office in the Anatomy Department were located directly above the smallpox research laboratory, which studied strains of the Variola virus.
The lab was directed by Professor Henry Bedson, a respected virologist who was rushing to conclude his research before the facility’s closure. The subsequent investigation, known as the Shooter Inquiry, concluded Parker was infected with the Abid strain, which Bedson’s lab handled in late July 1978. The primary hypothesis centered on a failure in the building’s infrastructure and laboratory procedures. The inquiry suggested the virus escaped the high-security containment area through a poorly maintained service duct or ventilation system.
The most likely scenario was that aerosolized virus particles were carried by air current from the lab below into the telephone room above, where Parker frequently worked. The investigation revealed that the laboratory facilities were outdated and failed to meet necessary biosafety standards for handling Category A pathogens. Although the exact transmission mechanism remained unproven, the virus’s origin was unequivocally traced back to the laboratory’s active research stocks.
Public Health Crisis and Immediate Aftermath
The smallpox diagnosis in a major British city triggered an emergency public health mobilization. Authorities immediately implemented contact tracing and quarantine measures for anyone who had been in contact with Parker, including family, friends, and medical personnel. Hundreds of people were quarantined, with many close contacts isolated at Catherine-de-Barnes Hospital.
A mass vaccination campaign was rapidly organized throughout the Birmingham area to create a ring of immunity around the potential outbreak zone. Over 50,000 residents received smallpox vaccinations in the following weeks, reflecting the gravity of the threat. This swift public health response successfully contained the virus, preventing a wider epidemic in the densely populated city.
The outbreak resulted in further personal tragedies. Janet Parker’s mother, Hilda Whitcomb, contracted a mild case of the virus after contact with her daughter, despite receiving a vaccination. Hilda recovered but remained isolated and could not attend her daughter’s funeral. Professor Henry Bedson, overwhelmed by the realization that his laboratory was the source of the breach, died by suicide on September 1, 1978, before Parker passed away.
The End of Smallpox Research in the UK
The Shooter Inquiry’s final report identified multiple instances of negligence and procedural failures within the Birmingham laboratory and the university’s oversight structure. The report criticized the inadequate physical containment measures and the laboratory head’s failure to fully inform authorities about the scope of the virus work. These findings condemned the safety protocols in place for handling dangerous pathogens.
As a direct consequence of the outbreak, the smallpox research facility at the University of Birmingham was permanently closed and thoroughly fumigated. This incident prompted global policy change regarding the storage and study of the smallpox virus. The World Health Organization reinforced its decision to drastically limit the number of laboratories authorized to hold the virus.
The remaining smallpox stocks worldwide were subsequently destroyed or consolidated into just two high-security repositories. These locations are the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, USA, and the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (Vector) in Koltsovo, Russia. Janet Parker’s death became the final event in the global eradication of smallpox, highlighting the risks associated with maintaining the deadly virus for research.